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Abstract 
There has been considerable controversy around the limits and reproducibility of so-called 
‘behavior’ priming effects. Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Loersch (2016) reported a series of 6 
experiments on the effects of primes on participants’ bets in a simulated blackjack game, 
and claimed that their findings not only establish the reality of behavior priming beyond 
dispute, but also demonstrate that this form of priming has the crucial hallmark of occurring 
outside participants’ awareness and control. I describe a statistical model which does not 
distinguish automatic and controlled processes, but which nonetheless reproduces Payne et 
al.’s results and hence shows that their conclusions are unwarranted. Payne et al.’s 
experimental task and within-subjects design provide little insight into why some behavior 
priming studies have proven difficult to replicate. 
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The psychological and behavioral sciences are going through a period of deep reflection 
about their research methods and capacity for revealing the truth about Nature. Although 
this reflection has grown to encompass many elements including questionable research 
practices, statistical methods, and publishing models, one of its key drivers is disagreement 
and debate about a simple phenomenon which has become known, for better or worse, as 
‘behavior’ or ‘social’ priming. 
This phenomenon has taken centre stage because, as Molden (2014, p. 1) observes, “it is 
now virtually axiomatic among social psychologists that the mere exposure to socially 
relevant stimuli can facilitate, or prime, a host of impressions, judgments, goals, and actions, 
often even outside of people’s intention or awareness.” Unfortunately, many of the most 
influential examples of behavior priming1 have proven very difficult to replicate (see 
Cesario, 2014; Kahneman, 2012)(see also special issue of Social Cognition, June 2014). A 
recent meta-analysis of 352 effect sizes from studies of the effects of incidentally-presented 
action-related prime words on task performance (Weingarten et al., 2016) serves to 
highlight this concern, despite the fact that it obtained an overall statistically significant 
(albeit small) priming effect (d  0.3-0.4). Two of the apparently-successful studies included 
in the meta-analysis (Albarracín et al., 2008; Eitam, Hassin, & Schul, 2008) were re-examined 
in the Reproducibility Project (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). High-powered, pre-
registered replication attempts were unsuccessful in both cases. Although these two studies 
represent a small proportion of the significant effects in the meta-analysis, they can be 
regarded as selected at random. When combined with the statistically significant evidence 
of publication bias in the meta-analysis (Weingarten et al., 2016), the replication failures 
cast considerable doubt on the reality and reproducibility of this form of behavior priming.  
The article by Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, and Loersch (2016; henceforth PBL) is presented as a 
contribution to this debate. These researchers reported a series of 6 experiments on the 
effects of primes on participants’ bets in a simulated blackjack game, and argued that their 
findings establish the reality of behavior priming beyond dispute. On the basis of their 
findings, PBL suggested that the reason some prominent behavior priming studies have 
proven hard to replicate is that they (and the replications) employed weak and under-
powered between-subjects designs. In addition to these two theoretical claims, PBL also 
claimed that this form of priming has the crucial hallmark of occurring outside participants’ 
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awareness and control. This assertion is the focus of the present Comment. I argue here 
that this empirical claim, which is crucial to the framing of behaviour priming, can be 
challenged on both conceptual and methodological grounds. In the final discussion I also 
comment briefly on PBL’s two theoretical inferences. 
The experimental task employed in PBL’s experiments is simple and involves participants 
choosing to bet or pass on each trial of a blackjack-like gambling game. On critical trials 
where the participants’ two cards had intermediate values (defined as 8-17 or 11-14, 
depending on the experiment) and where the outcome (win/lose) was arranged to be 
completely random, the decision to bet was influenced by a brief (300 ms) but clearly visible 
prime (e.g., the facilitating word ‘gamble’ or the inhibiting word ‘stay’) presented prior to 
each choice but uncorrelated with the outcome. This effect was replicated across all of their 
experiments. PBL’s experimental results establish very firmly that gambling decisions can be 
primed, and (with the exception of the results of Experiment 4, as noted below) the present 
Comment does not question this aspect of their findings. 
Awareness and the process dissociation procedure 
PBL note that “Behavior priming effects are important for psychological theory because they 
provide evidence about the influence of automatic or unconscious processes on behavior” 
(p. 1269). Their theoretical interpretation of the priming effects observed in their 
experiments, based on the Situated Inference Model (Loersch & Payne, 2014), proposes that 
participants mistake the source of mental contents activated by the prime. Instead of 
recognizing that the thought of betting on a given trial has been caused by the prime, the 
participant misattributes this thought to her own internal evaluation of the situation and 
believes that it is self-generated. In turn this misattribution leads to lack of awareness of the 
prime’s true influence. PBL’s Experiments 4-6 investigated this important property. 
In Experiment 4 the primes were presented briefly for 12 ms and pre- and post-masked by 
neutral words each presented for 100 ms to suppress awareness. Because a priming effect 
(albeit somewhat reduced) was again obtained, the authors concluded that the effects 
observed were therefore indicative of unconscious or automatic processes. 
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When assessing awareness, the devil is usually in the details. PBL measured awareness in a 
test administered after the main gambling phase of the experiment. On each trial a 
sequence was presented that was identical to a gambling trial (premask word → prime → 
postmask word) but were asked to type in the 3 words in three dialog boxes labelled first 
word, second word, and third word. They entered ‘99’ if they did not see a word. PBL 
observed that one participant correctly reported a single prime word. 
For decades researchers have grappled with the problem of possible response bias in 
awareness tests because it is known that such tests can underestimate awareness if 
participants adopt a conservative reporting criterion (Eriksen, 1960; Kunimoto, Miller, & 
Pashler, 2001). Participants’ confidence in their identification of the prime word may have 
been so low that they simply decided to type 99 (which also requires less effort). A further 
issue is that participants’ task in the awareness test was not at all the same as in the main 
gambling task. Instead of clicking a button to indicate their choice (bet or pass), they had to 
write down 3 words, a difference that could easily have contributed to a reduction in 
sensitivity. The first (premask) and third (postmask) words were fully visible and easy to 
perceive relative to the prime, hence it is also likely that these “easy” words were recalled 
and typed first, attenuating accurate reporting of the “difficult” prime word. 
It is also important to emphasize that the priming effect in this study was fragile. Although 
there was a significant priming × hand value interaction, the main effect of priming was far 
from significant (as PBL noted). Moreover only 53/115 participants showed a numerically 
positive priming effect across the critical hands against 46/115 who showed a negative 
effect (and 16 had a zero effect), a distribution which is not significant by a sign test, one-
tailed p = 0.273. It is easy to see that the priming × hand value interaction could be 
attributable to just a small number of participants who consciously detected and responded 
in accordance with some of the primes. 
In Experiments 5 and 6 PBL attempted to separate controlled/conscious from 
automatic/unconscious influences of the prime by employing the process dissociation 
procedure (PDP; Jacoby, 1991) to analyze performance in Inclusion and Exclusion versions of 
the gambling task. The Exclusion version was the standard task from the preceding 
experiments in which participants were instructed to ignore the uninformative prime word. 
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In the Inclusion version, by contrast, they were instructed that the prime was “a hint and is 
informative on more trials than not, so you may want to consider this word in your decision” 
(Payne et al., 2016, p. 1275). A substantially larger priming effect was obtained in the 
Inclusion condition. This, on its own, demonstrates that at least part of the effect must be 
controllable; the question is whether in addition to this controllable component there is also 
a contribution of uncontrollable/automatic processes to the priming effect? The data for 
Experiment 5 are shown in the top row of Figure 1. 
To apply the process dissociation procedure, PBL calculated the proportion of prime-
consistent responses (by summing the number of bet responses given a bet prime and the 
number of pass responses given a pass prime), and then calculated the PDP parameters for 
controlled/conscious processes (C) and automatic (unconscious) processes (A) from the 
formulae: 
C = P(Prime-consistent|Inclusion) - P(Prime-consistent|Exclusion) (1) 
A = P(Prime-consistent|Exclusion)/(1 - C) (2) 
PBL asserted that if there are no automatic effects then A = 0.5, while if there are no 
controlled effects then C = 0 (I return to this point below). The results for Experiments 5 (see 
Figure 2) and 6 showed that C was greater than zero but did not differ significantly when 
comparing ambiguous hands (with total card values 11-14) versus unambiguous hands 
(values 8-10 and 15-17). A was greater than 0.5 but did differ significantly, albeit by a very 
small amount numerically, between ambiguous and unambiguous hands. PBL interpreted 
this pattern as evidence not only of the controlled/automatic distinction, but also as 
supporting their hypothesis (derived from the Situated Inference Model) that the automatic 
effect of the prime via misattribution would be greater when the participant is more 
uncertain – that is, on ambiguous hands. 
There are several problems with this analysis. First, the PDP requires contrasting a condition 
in which participants are motivated to include some information in their response with one 
in which they are motivated to exclude it. But in the Exclusion instructions of these 
experiments participants were merely told that the prime was a distractor and that they 
should try not to let it influence their decision. No incentives were provided for doing this 
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and it seems possible that at least some participants may have paid little heed to the 
instruction and hence not made much effort to inhibit the prime’s influence (of which they 
may have been fully aware). It is important to realise that there is nothing at all irrational 
about participants’ use of the prime to guide their choices. Given that the payoff on each 
critical trial was completely random, there was nothing the participant could do to either 
increase or decrease her chances of winning (this does not apply of course to the noncritical 
trials). Making a choice on each critical trial that is identical to the prime neither reduces nor 
increases the payoff probability. Indeed responding in alignment with the prime could be 
seen as wholly rational. For example, it requires cognitive effort to make a binary choice 
across many trials. By simply responding on the basis of the prime, cognitive effort is 
reduced at no cost in terms of financial payoff. 
Secondly, PBL calculated C and A parameters separately for ambiguous and unambiguous 
hands. While this may make sense from the perspective of the Situated Inference Model, it 
is hard to see its justification within the theoretical framework of the process dissociation 
procedure, and indeed is at variance with PBL’s own description of the PDP: 
“In our task, participants could be influenced by the prime either intentionally (e.g., by 
using the prime as a hint) or automatically (e.g., making prime-consistent responses 
despite trying to ignore the prime). Note that the model does not take the hand value 
into account when estimating automatic and controlled influences.” (p. 1275). 
Ambiguous and unambiguous hands differ only in their points value, so calculating separate 
parameter estimates implies a process whereby the magnitude of controlled and automatic 
influences on a given trial is determined after each card pair is viewed by the participant, in 
contradiction of the statement above. This is not in keeping with the PDP’s assumption that 
C and A are governed by systematic cognitive factors such as attention or depth of 
processing. It is analogous to applying the PDP separately to high- and low-frequency words 
in a memory experiment, for example. PBL offered no justification for applying the PDP in 
this way. Indeed, their application of the PDP to the data they collected in their Experiments 
5 and 6 failed to take heed of the known boundary conditions of the procedure. It is well-
established for example that the independence assumption needs careful validation and 
that the precise wording of the test instructions can be important (see Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
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2012). The procedure “cannot be “taken off the shelf” with no regard for meeting boundary 
conditions” (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 2012, p. 676). PBL reported no analyses of the 
appropriateness of their application of the PDP to their data. 
Finally, and more fundamentally, the PDP is not always a reliable method for teasing apart 
conscious and unconscious processes. Ratcliff, McKoon, and Van Zandt (1995) showed that 
the PDP identifies two dissociable processes even when the data are known to have been 
generated by a single process. The simulation I report now applies the same reasoning to 
PBL’s procedure. 
A model of Inclusion/Exclusion performance 
In this simple statistical model, each trial begins with the independent selection of two 
cards, each drawn with probability 1/13. Their values are summed and denoted by T (total). 
Next, the prime is selected at random to be either a bet or pass word, assigned the values 
+1 and -1, respectively, and denoted V (value). This prime value is weighted by amount W. 
The total evidence E on which each choice is based is therefore 
E = T + W.V - 12.5 (3) 
where 12.5 is subtracted to center the output at that value, the mean hand value. To 
translate this into an actual choice, E is transformed by a sigmoid function: 
𝑃(𝑏𝑒𝑡) =  
1
1+𝑒−𝑆.𝐸
 (4) 
where S is a slope parameter (set to 0.7 in the simulation). 
The crucial feature of the model is that the weight W, which can be interpreted as an 
attentional or decision weight, is permitted to vary between the Inclusion and Exclusion 
conditions. In the standard Exclusion condition in which participants are instructed to pay 
no heed to the prime, we assume that W is very small (0.3 in the simulation), whereas in the 
Inclusion condition, the instruction to consider the prime in their decision causes 
participants to assign a higher value to W (1.0 in the simulation). Although restricted to 
being nonnegative, this decision weight is not assumed to have a lower bound: A value of 
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0.0 – a complete lack of any priming effect, and hence no automatic influence – would apply 
if the participant gave the prime no weight. 
This model is more parsimonious than PBL’s in terms of numbers of free parameters: 3 
parameters (W with 2 values, and S) to predict 4 dependent measures (the proportions of 
prime-consistent responses in the Inclusion and Exclusion conditions, for ambiguous and 
unambiguous hands), whereas PBL’s model requires 4 parameters (A and C values for each 
hand type) each with one value to predict the same 4 measures2. The statistical model 
embodied in Equations 3 and 4 is therefore both broader in scope (as it makes predictions 
for prime-consistent responding on each hand) and more parsimonious. 
The model is able to simulate the major findings without difficulty. The bottom row of 
Figure 1 shows the predicted proportion of betting choices for the Inclusion (left panel) and 
Exclusion (right panel) conditions, respectively. Clearly, the model captures the overall 
increase in betting choices as hand value increases, as well as the fact that the priming 
effect is greater for ambiguous than for unambiguous hands, which arises simply as a result 
of the sigmoidal squashing function (Equation 3) that transforms evidence into choice 
probabilities. More importantly, the model generates a greater influence of the prime under 
Inclusion conditions. In the Inclusion condition, the weight given to the prime biases betting 
responses upwards when the prime is a bet word and downwards when it is a pass word, 
and is equivalent to changing the total card value by more than one point. Of course this 
depends on the W parameter. When W = 0, there is no priming effect at all. 
Not only does the model account for choice behavior in the Inclusion and Exclusion 
conditions, it also yields good approximations to the C and A parameters when its 
predictions are taken as the input to the process dissociation procedure of Equations 1 and 
2. As shown in Figure 2, C is estimated to be small but greater than zero while A is larger 
than 0.5. The contrast between unambiguous and ambiguous hands is larger for A than C3. 
Thus the model’s predictions, which all fall within the 95% confidence intervals of the 
empirical estimates, match the observed results closely. 
In sum, an obvious interpretation of the success of this straightforward statistical model is 
simply that the Inclusion instructions encouraged participants to pay more attention to the 
prime. The experimental results and their interpretation through the lens of the process 
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dissociation procedure do not establish that the priming effect is driven in part by 
automatic/unconscious processes, because a model which makes no distinction between 
controlled and automatic processes is equally compatible with the data. 
The simulation provides further evidence (Ratcliff et al., 1995) that the PDP is, if misapplied, 
a flawed technique for isolating mental processes. The PDP misdiagnoses the simulation 
results as arising from independent automatic and controlled processes. By extension, we 
can also conclude that it similarly misdiagnoses the behavior of PBL’s participants. Indeed 
this can be illustrated even more directly by a simple thought experiment. Imagine that 
participants exert complete control over their responding and that there are no automatic 
influences on their behavior. In the Inclusion condition they deliberately respond in 
accordance with the prime on some trials, while on other trials they ignore it completely. 
Their overall concordance probability might be 0.62, for example, which is the level of 
prime-consistent responses in the Inclusion condition of Experiment 5. Suppose also that 
they completely avoid any influence of the prime in the Exclusion condition – perhaps they 
close their eyes briefly on each trial when the prime is displayed. Assuming participants bet 
and pass with equal overall probability, then their proportion of prime-consistent responses 
in this condition will be 0.54. From Equation 1 we obtain C = 0.62 – 0.5 = 0.12 (despite the 
fact that participants have complete control), and from Equation 2 we obtain A = 0.5/(1 – 
0.12) = 0.57. Thus the PDP yields the nonsensical and false conclusion that there are reliable 
automatic influences (A > 0.5) in this set of circumstances. In fact from Equation 2 it is clear 
that whenever C > 0, the PDP yields A > 0.5 if P(Prime-consistent|Exclusion) = 0.5. 
It is, in essence, a basic property of the PDP as applied by PBL to their task that automatic 
influences can only be completely absent (A = 0.5) when C = 0, that is, when the prime has 
no detectable influence whatsoever. PBL’s finding of A values greater than 0.5 is not a 
psychological discovery but an arithmetic inevitability. 
The points of difference between PBL’s account and the one offered here are worth 
emphasizing. In PBL’s explanation, there are distinct automatic and controlled mental 
processes. The prime automatically activates thoughts of betting or passing, and these are 
misattributed to internally-generated evaluations. This misattribution, and hence the 
automatic priming effect, is larger on ambiguous than on unambiguous hands. In the 
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account offered here, there is no automatic/controlled distinction, no distinction between 
the processes operating on ambiguous and unambiguous hands, and no misattribution 
process. Instead, the observed data patterns for both the probability of prime-consistent 
responding and the PDP parameters are emergent properties of a mechanism which 
integrates all relevant sources of information, modulated by a decision weight. 
Concluding comments 
Payne et al. (2016) present evidence that a brief prime can influence participants’ decisions 
in a betting game. However, because of the limitations of the PDP method and analysis in 
Experiments 5 and 6, their conclusion that this effect has an automatic component is 
unjustified. Contrary to what they claim, their experiments do not therefore establish the 
existence of behaviour priming, defined as the automatic influence of a prime on behaviour. 
As noted at the beginning of this Comment, PBL’s article seeks to do substantially more than 
demonstrate unconscious priming. It aims to establish the reality of behavior priming 
beyond dispute by providing a novel experimental tool, and to make the case that the 
employment of under-powered between-subjects designs explains why some prominent 
behavior priming studies have proven hard to replicate. Are these claims warranted? 
PBL acknowledge that priming effects on evaluation of and judgments about stimuli have 
previously been established beyond dispute, but suggest that “like semantic priming, these 
paradigms focus on processing of subsequent stimuli rather than on decisions or actions 
that are traditionally considered to be “behaviors”” (Payne et al., 2016, p. 1271). They 
suggest that their results are novel because they “demonstrate, most simply, that primes 
can affect subsequent behavior, not just the ability to process subsequent stimuli” (p. 1271) 
and “provide evidence that primes can reliably affect behavior, under at least some 
conditions” (p. 1269). Is this evidence truly novel? In fact it is not difficult to find prior 
demonstrations that decisions and actions can be biased by some priming cue. A study by 
Ludvig, Madan, and Spetch (2015) is particularly relevant because it reported a priming 
effect very similar to PBL’s. Participants in this experiment saw 2 stimuli (images of 
distinctive doors) on each critical trial, one a risky choice and the other a safe choice. If a 
prime, comprising an image previously associated with reward, was presented prior to the 
choice stimuli then risk-taking was increased by about 15%, even though (as in the key trials 
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in PBL’s procedure) the prime was not predictive of the trial outcome. PBL did not cite this 
study despite its conceptual similarity to their own experimental method and outcome. The 
only major difference is the use of a prime picture whose association with reward was 
learned during the experiment (Ludvig et al., 2015) versus a prime word semantically related 
to reward (PBL).  
Whatever the merits of drawing a distinction between priming as the facilitation of 
processing subsequent stimuli, on the one hand, and priming of decisions or actions on the 
other, there can be little dispute that both forms of priming are well-established. 
A second reason to doubt the relevance of PBL’s findings to the wider behavior priming 
debate is the substantial difference in timescale (see Wentura & Rothermund, 2014, for a 
detailed discussion of this issue). In PBL’s procedure the choice options were presented 100 
ms after the prime. Although participants were under no time pressure, their responses 
were presumably made within a matter of a few seconds of the prime at most. In a typical 
behavior priming study, in contrast, the prime-behavior interval might be two orders of 
magnitude greater than this. For example, in the studies included in Weingarten et al.’s 
(2016) meta-analysis the interval ranged from around 3-8 min. The controversial ‘flag’ 
priming effect of Carter, Ferguson, and Hassin (2011) was claimed to endure across an 8-
month interval. PBL themselves noted in passing this timescale difference but nonetheless 
drew conclusions from their studies about behaviour priming more generally. Such 
conclusions, I argue, are unjustified. 
The fact that risky choices were affected by subtle primes in PBL’s experiments is an 
important result of considerable relevance to theories of decision making. But PBL’s claim 
that their experiments – by demonstrating that choices can be primed – make a 
contribution to the behavior priming controversy and “provide important evidence for 
debates about the reality and replicability of priming phenomena” (p. 1277) rests on 
inadequate acknowledgement of past research and glossing over a substantial difference in 
timescale. 
What about PBL’s other theoretical conclusion, that the employment of under-powered 
between-subjects designs explains why some prominent behavior priming studies have 
proven hard to replicate? If decisions and actions can be primed, then why (PBL ask) has it 
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proven so difficult to establish such priming effects beyond dispute? PBL point to 
experimental design combined with statistical power as a key factor. They observe that 
“behavior priming studies typically use a between-subjects design… Semantic priming, in 
contrast, uses within-subjects designs in which each subject responds to all prime-target 
combinations over dozens or hundreds of trials” (p. 1271). Other things being equal, within-
subjects designs will usually be more powerful, regardless of the topic under study. But 
many demonstrations of priming of actions and decisions have employed within-subjects 
designs (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2007; Ludvig et al., 2015). 
PBL suggest that their use of a within-subjects design sheds light on past replication failures, 
but here again their reasoning seems flawed. They ask whether 
“In studies where failed null replications have been reported, is it the psychological 
effect of primes on behavior that is in question, or is it mundane methodological 
factors like statistical power? Our results suggest that methodological factors play an 
important role. If so, we may revise our beliefs about effect sizes and variability of 
previously reported effects, but not about the basic psychological effect in question.” 
Yet they provide no direct evidence that priming is more consistent in within-subjects 
designs, and they make no mention that statistical power was explicitly considered at the 
time of deciding on sample size in almost every priming replication failure in the past few 
years (e.g., Gomes & McCullough, 2015; Klein, others, & Nosek, 2014; Rohrer, Pashler, & 
Harris, 2015). For instance, Klein et al.’s (2014) Many Labs replication achieved power of 
1.000 to detect 2 behavior priming results, yet failed to do so. When so much of the recent 
debate has concerned power, sample sizes, confidence intervals and so on, to suggest that 
many or at least some of the prominent replication failures have arisen merely as a result of 
low power seems unconvincing. 
The key issue is that priming ‘skeptics’ do not question all examples of behavior priming, 
only some. PBL’s position is that the crucial domain is priming effects on actions and 
decisions that cannot be simply explained as arising from enhancement of stimulus 
processing. To paraphrase their viewpoint, past studies in this domain have been 
predominantly studied in fragile between-subjects experiments and hence false negatives 
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have occurred when low-powered replication studies have been undertaken. But 
considering experimental design, I contend, sheds minimal light on the priming controversy. 
There is a rather different explanation for why some behavior priming effects have proven 
so difficult to replicate, namely that they are false positives emerging from a mistaken view 
of the human mind. Perhaps the mind is not an iceberg much of whose modular structure is 
below the waterline of awareness, and perhaps the unconscious cannot in reality perform 
all of the high-level functions that the conscious mind can (Bargh, 2014b; Hassin, 2013)? 
There is much evidence that unconscious processes, if they exist at all, are narrow, fleeting, 
and insufficient to provide the level of transfer from the prime to the target behavior that 
the controversial studies uniformly assume (see Newell & Shanks, 2014). To activate the 
stereotype ‘professor’ and observe a downstream effect on an individual’s ability to answer 
the question “What is the total number of spots on a die?” (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 
1998) would require a rich pathway of interconnecting concepts and processes which is 
orders of magnitude beyond what is typically revealed in more conventional (e.g., 
repetition) priming experiments, where priming is commonly found to transfer remarkably 
narrowly across tasks and time (e.g., Franks, Bilbrey, Lien, & McNamara, 2000). 
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Footnotes 
1. Behavior priming as characterised by Molden (2014) has to be clearly distinguished 
from the phenomenon of priming as typically studied by experimental cognitive 
psychologists, often interpreted as the spread of activation from one mental 
representation to a closely related one. Although the precise demarcation between 
‘behavior’ and ‘cognitive’ priming is a matter of debate (Bargh, 2014a), there is no 
controversy over the reality of the priming effects obtained in hundreds of studies 
on masking, repetition priming, lexical decision, and so on. For present purposes 
behavior priming is characterized as the priming of overt behaviors including 
decisions/actions, rather than simply as facilitation in the processing of subsequent 
stimuli. 
2. Given that the PDP model has as many free parameters as there are datapoints, it is 
of course unfalsifiable in the sense that it can be fitted perfectly to any pattern of 
values of P(Prime-consistent|Inclusion) and P(Prime-consistent|Exclusion) (except 
when the former is 1 and the latter is zero, in which case A is undefined). However 
an additional meta-theoretical constraint is that experimental manipulations (such as 
instructions that the prime is a useful hint) will have systematic effects on the model 
parameters, for instance affecting C but not A or vice versa. 
3. The model can generate quite substantial differences between the effect of hand 
type (Ambiguous/Unambiguous) on estimates of A compared to C. However I do not 
pursue this aspect of the experiment in depth because the empirical results are 
equivocal. PBL reported that hand type had a significant effect on A in both 
Experiments 5 and 6, and that its effect on C was not significant in either experiment. 
Yet analysis of variance reveals that the measure (A vs. C) × hand type interaction 
was only significant in Experiment 5, F(1, 208) = 11.88, p = .001, and not in 
Experiment 6, F(1, 178) = 2.03, p = .16. 
4. It is important to note that the terms P(Prime-consistent|Inclusion) and P(Prime-
consistent|Exclusion) in Equations 1 and 2 have minimum values of 0.5. Given that 
the prime is chosen at random on each trial, 50% of responses will be consistent with 
the prime by chance alone. The only exception to this would arise if a participant 
chose to deliberately respond in opposition to the prime (that is, chose to bet 
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whenever the prime was a pass word and vice versa) but this would lead to negative 
values of C and render the PDP uninterpretable. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1: Proportion of betting choices as a function of hand value. Left column: Inclusion 
condition. Right column: Exclusion condition. Top row: Data from Payne et al.’s Experiment 
5. Bottom row: Model results. 
Figure 2: Mean estimates of the parameters for controlled (C) and automatic (A) responding 
for ambiguous (values 11-14) and unambiguous (values 8-10 and 15-17) hands derived from 
applying the process dissociation procedure of Equations 1 and 2, for Payne et al.’s 
Experiment 5, Experiment 6, and the model described in the text. Amb = ambiguous, Unamb 
= unambiguous. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals. 
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